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Cross-Border Movement of Patients in the EU: 
 a Re-Appraisal 
 
Clemens M Rieder1 
The national welfare state, so it seems, has come under attack by European integration. This 
article focuses on one facet of the welfare state, that is, health care and on one specific 
dimension, that is, cross-border movement of patients. The institution which has played a 
pivotal role in the development of the framework regulating the migration of patients is the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ). The Court’s activity in this sensitive area has not remained 
without critics. This was even more so since the Court invoked Treaty (primary) law which not 
only has made it difficult to overturn case law but also has left the legislator with very little 
room for manoeuvre in relation to any future (secondary) EU law. What is therefore of special 
interest in terms of legitimacy is the legal reasoning by which the Court has made its 
contribution to the development of this framework. This article is a re-appraisal of the legal 
development in this field.  
Health care, solidarity, ECJ, free movement of services 
 
Boundaries are of pivotal importance when it comes to health care systems. They are necessary 
because partial solidarity,2 which forms the basis of the welfare state, requires boundaries.3 If 
boundaries are essential for the functioning of the welfare state, then the connection between 
the welfare state and nation state only becomes obvious because with the advent of the nation 
state, societies have been transformed into highly bounded entities.4 The range of impact the 
health care framework of the EU can have on boundaries reaches from making them more 
                                                 
1 Academic Fellow, University of Lancaster. I gratefully acknowledge the award of a British Academy Mid-
Career Fellowship. I am thankful to Sonja Puntscher-Riekmann for hosting me during parts of the summer 2013 
at the Salzburg Centre of European Union Studies where a first draft of this article was written. I am grateful to 
Professor Gareth Davies and Professor Steven Weatherill and, as always, Lisa Warren for their comments on an 
earlier draft. All errors remain mine. The author can be contacted at <c.rieder@lancaster.ac.uk>. 
2 This is to be contrasted with the solidarity of the Good Samaritan.  
3 M Ferrera, The Boundaries of Welfare. European Integration and the New Spatial Politics of Social Protection 
(Oxford University Press 2005) 2. 
4 A Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Polity 1990) 14. 
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permeable which means that the individual health care systems become coordinated to 
integration which means that boundaries are dissolved or redrawn.5  
Generally it seems fair to say that patients wish to exit their system of affiliation 
predominately for two reasons: first, they prefer to have access to the treatment they need as 
quickly as possible; I will call this the ‘vector of time’. Secondly, patients hope for better 
treatment which can either mean that the same treatment is performed more skilfully elsewhere 
or patients seek to gain access to treatment which is not even available in their system of 
affiliation; I will refer to this as the ‘vector of treatment’. It is therefore of no coincidence that 
the authorisation regime of the EU, which regulates the terms and conditions when patients 
become allowed to exit their system of affiliation, focuses on the above mentioned vectors of 
‘time’ and ‘treatment’. In particular, secondary EU law and here most notably, Article 20 of 
Regulation No 883/2004,6 gives a rather detailed account of the two vectors as will be outlined 
below.   
The Court, beginning implicitly with Luisi and Carbone7 and explicitly continued in 
the seminal case of Kohll8 decided to link health care with free movement of services (Article 
56 et seq. TFEU). This move by the Court turned out to be rather ‘controversial’9. The Court, 
has been criticised on various occasions for its ‘activism’, especially in relation to its 
interpretation of Treaty provisions.10 However, activism in relation to the Treaty is a 
particularly sensitive matter because it is relatively easy for the Court to transform itself into 
                                                 
5 Ferrera, op. cit. supra note 3, 3. 
6 Regulation (EC) No 883/2004/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the 
coordination of social security systems [2004] O.J. L 166/1. 
7 Joined Cases 286/82 and 36/8 3 Luisi and Carbone, EU:C:1984:35, para 16. 
8 Case C-158/96 Kohll, EU:C:1998:171, para 29. 
9 A. G. Sharpston, C-512/08 Commission v France, EU:C:2010:427, para 1 (reference omitted).  
10 Cf J Snell, ‘The Legitimacy of Free Movement Case Law: Process and Substance’ in M Adams et al. (eds.), 
Judging Europe’s Judges. The Legitimacy of the Case Law of the European Court of Justice (Hart Publishing 
2013) 109, 111-112. 
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an agenda setter which is capable of limiting options available not only for the national but also 
the EU legislator.11 The most recent evidence in this regard is Directive 2011/24 which 
regulates the rights of patients in cross-border health care. The EU legislator – as a consequence 
of the Court’s case law – was de facto left with only limited choices to make.12 These 
considerations award a reappraisal of the existing case law. 
The aim of this article is to give a reconstructive account regarding the legitimacy of 
the Court’s case law in the field of patient migration. In contrast to the existing literature this 
article seeks to justify the use of primary EU law in the field of health care by making reference 
to secondary EU health care law, that is, most notably Article 20 Regulation 883/2004. 
Conceptually this approach is based on Dworkin’s idea which treats law as integrity. Briefly 
stated, respecting the integrity of law requires one to look back in history in order to establish 
whether principles have been applied consistently over time. This will be the focus of section 
1 of this article. Yet integrity in law also makes it necessary to ‘look across’ in order to study 
whether principles are established consistently across the law. This will be the focus of sections 
2 and 3.13 Law as integrity means that every judge interprets the law in accordance with its best 
possible reading.14 
 
1. The Meaning of Free Movement of Services 
 
                                                 
11 M Dougan, ‘The Bubble that Burst: Exploring the Legitimacy of the Case Law on the Free Movement of 
Union Citizens’ in M Adams et al. (eds.), Judging Europe’s Judges. The Legitimacy of the Case Law of the 
European Court of Justice (Hart Publishing 2013) 127, 129-130; G Davies, ‘Legislative Control of the 
European Court of Justice’ 51 Common Market Law Review (2014) 1579, 1603. 
12 Directive 2011/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2011 on the Application of 
Patient’s Rights in Cross-Border Health Care [2011] O.J. L88/45. 
13 R Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Hart Publishing 1998) 227-228. 
14 Ibid., 360. 
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In order to establish whether health care constitutes a service in accordance with the Treaty the 
starting point is Article 57 TFEU which stipulates that ‘[s]ervices shall be considered to be 
“services” within the meaning of the Treaties where they are normally provided for 
remuneration.’ In legal positivist thinking the provision clearly constitutes an example of ‘open 
texture’, that is, one finds ‘duality of a core of certainty and a penumbra of doubt’.15 The 
existence of doubt is also evidenced by the disagreement which is usually rare to find between 
the Court and its Advocate Generals. Yet it surfaced on the question as to whether free 
movement of services ought to be applicable in relation to health care. The two Advocate 
Generals developed their (dissenting) arguments in the light of the Court’s (earlier) case law in 
the field of education. Such mutual references are plausible because health care and education 
are both public services for which ‘many of the same arguments apply’.16 Yet in Humbel17 the 
Court had found that education does not constitute a service which is provided for 
remuneration, whereas in health care the Court arrived at the opposite conclusion.  
Two preliminary observations can be made about the relationship between education 
and health care. First, and based on the involvement of solidarity, Somek argues that the Court 
should have pursued the same approach it had chosen in public education and decided that 
health care is beyond the reach of the Treaty.18 This is in line with Hervey who considers 
solidarity to be ‘a buttress against market law’.19 Second, Shuibhne argues that the two strands 
of case law are not only conflicting but evidence of the Court’s ‘incompleteness of reasoning 
                                                 
15 H L A Hart, The Concept of Law, 3rd ed. (Oxford University Press 2012) 123. 
16 J Le Grand, The Other Invisible Hand: Delivering Public Services through Choice and Competition 
(Princeton University Press 2000) 96. 
17 Case 263/86 Humbel, EU:C:1988:451, para 20; also N Bernard, ‘Between a Rock and a Soft Place: Internal 
Market versus Open Co-ordination in EU Social Welfare Law’ in M Dougan and E Spaventa (eds.), Social 
Welfare and EU Law (Hart Publishing 2005) 261, 270-275. 
18 A Somek, ‘Solidarity Decomposed: Being and Time in European Citizenship’, 32 European Law Review 
(2007) 787, 788-789. 
19 T K Hervey, ‘Social Solidarity: a Buttress against Internal Market Law’, in J Shaw (ed.), Social Law and 
Policy in an Evolving European Union (Hart Publishing 2000) 31-47. 
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and the selective citation of existing authority.’20 If her finding is persuasive this presents a 
serious problem for the Court because legal reasoning and legitimacy are interconnected.21 It 
is therefore necessary to examine whether a plausible argument can be made which allows for 
treating health care and education differently or, alternatively, whether it must be concluded 
that one was decided wrongly. One can argue that judges are faced with hard cases when it 
comes to health care.  
 
INTERPRETATION THROUGH TEXTUALISM 
The story of cross-border movement begins – as is well known – with Mr Kohll’s daughter 
who was insured in Luxembourg but had received dental treatment by an orthodontist 
established in Germany. In line with Luxembourg national law but also Article 22 of 
Regulation No 1408/71 Mr Kohll had asked for prior authorisation from the competent national 
authority but was denied on grounds that his daughter’s dental treatment was neither urgent 
(vector of time) nor unavailable (vector of treatment) in Luxembourg. However, the legal 
journey did not end there. Advocate General Tesauro considered ‘medical activities’ to 
constitute a service in accordance with Article 57 TFEU.22  
When the case reached the ECJ it found without offering further justification that the 
treatment by the German dentist constituted a service in accordance with the Treaty.23 The 
consequence of this ruling was that health care treatment, more specifically non-hospital 
treatment, became part of free movement law. It is submitted that the character of legal 
                                                 
20 N N Shuibhne, The Coherence of EU Free Movement Law. Constitutional Responsibility and the Court of 
Justice (Oxford University Press 2013) 66. 
21 Cf. G Beck, The Legal Reasoning of the Court of Justice of the EU (Hart 2012) 92-95. 
22 A.G. Tesauro, Cases C-120/95 (Decker) and C-158/96 (Kohll), EU:C:1997:399, paras 15-25. 
23 Kohll, op. cit. supra note 8, para 29. 
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reasoning applied by the Court and its Advocate Generals can be best categorised as textualism. 
According to US Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, one of its chief proponents, the core 
characteristic of this method is that ‘[t]he text is the law, and it is the text that must be 
observed.’24 
Yet the consensus between the Court and its Advocate Generals that had still existed in 
Kohll came to an abrupt end with the subsequent cases of Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms25 and 
Vanbraekel.26 Judgments for both cases were delivered on the same day. Despite some factual 
changes about the way treatment was delivered in Kohll – hospital treatment instead of non-
hospital treatment, and the organisation of the system, benefits in kind instead of 
reimbursement – the basic question remained the same, namely whether services offered by 
public health care systems are provided for remuneration? The Court – in both cases – only 
made brief reference to the ‘settled case law’ of Luisi and Carbone and Kohll before it found, 
without hesitating, that medical services would fall indeed under the provisions of free 
movement of services.27 The Court simply argued that the mere fact that fees are pre-set and 
paid by a third party, i.e. the public insurance system, does not rule out the application of Article 
57 TFEU.28  
In contrast to the Court, Advocate General Saggio in his Opinion in Vanbraekel found 
‘that services which, on the one hand, are an integral part of the public health-care system, in 
the sense that they are established and organised by the State, and, on the other hand, are 
financed by public funds, must be excluded from the provisions on freedom of movement’.29 
The same conclusion was reached by Advocate General Colomer in Geraets-Smits and 
                                                 
24 Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation (Princeton University Press 1997) 22.  
25 Case C-157/99, Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms, EU:C:2001:404. 
26 Case C-368/98, Vanbraekel, EU:C:2001:400. 
27 Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms, op. cit. supra note 25, para 53; Vanbraekel, ibid., para 41. 
28 Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms, op. cit. supra note 25, paras 56-57. 
29 A.G. Saggio, Vanbraekel, EU:C:2000:271, para 21 (emphasis added). 
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Peerbooms,30 who also highlighted the organisational differences between the Luxembourg 
health care system in Kohll and the Dutch system in Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms. The 
Advocate General concluded that only the Dutch system is ‘free for insured persons’.31 The 
reasoning of the Advocate General, arguably, was inspired by the earlier case law on education. 
In the earlier case of Gravier, Advocate General Slynn had already addressed the question of 
whether education could possibly constitute a service which falls under the umbrella of the 
Treaty.  
The Advocate General thought that education could amount to ‘economic activities’32 
which were then to be governed by Article 57 TFEU. At the same time he also found that in 
the specific case of state education this was not the case because its aim was not to make 
economic profit. The Advocate General argued instead, that education forms part of the social 
policy of the state which covers all or most of its costs.33 In the later (education) case of Humbel 
the Court endorsed the reasoning of Advocate General Slynn albeit with a slightly further 
developed definition about the meaning of ‘remuneration’. For a service to be covered by the 
law on free movement of services, according to the Court, the service must, first, engage ‘in 
gainful activity’, secondly must not simply be the fulfilment of duties which a state has in 
relation to its own people and thirdly, must not be ‘funded from the public purse’.34 Applying 
these criteria in the context of public education the Court concluded that education did not 
constitute a service which is provided for remuneration.35  
                                                 
30 A.G. Colomer, Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms, EU:C:2000:274, para 33. 
31 Ibid., paras 25 (emphasis added); a rather similar argument was made in Case C-372/04 Watts, 
EU:C:2006:325 which originated from the English National Health Service (NHS). 
32 A.G. Slynn, C-293/83 Gravier, EU:C:1985:69, 602. 
33 Ibid., 603. 
34 Humbel, op. cit. supra note 17, para 18 (emphasis added). 
35 Ibid., para 20. 
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The important question which then needs to be addressed is whether these criteria, 
developed in the field of education, are at all helpful and can be meaningfully translated into 
the area of health care. The ‘profit-argument’, invoked by the Court, generally does not seem 
particularly useful in order to determine whether a respective service is provided for 
remuneration. Even in competition law, where the identification of economic activity is 
essential, the marker of ‘profit-making’ is absent.36 Also, it appears that the Court in the 
meantime has forgone of the profit argument altogether because it has been absent in the 
Court’s later case law on education.37 In addition, the ‘duty-argument’, which was also 
mentioned by the Court, does not necessarily constitute a helpful marker either because all 
actions of a state, as Davies rightly points out, are – one way or another – a fulfilment of its 
duties.38  
For a ‘transaction’ to be commercial, arguably, it is necessary that payer and recipient 
of the service are sufficiently distinct. This is not necessarily the case if ‘[t]he payer and the 
provider are essentially working together to provide a single service, rather than exchanging 
that service for money.’39 In order to illustrate this point Davies uses state universities as an 
example which most likely are organised as part of the Ministry of Education.40 The overall 
problem with this argument, which is based on ‘separateness’ of entities, is that it appears to 
operate less with absolute but more relative categories. This naturally begs the question: how 
much separateness is needed or what is considered to be too close? Closely related with 
transaction is the ‘funding-argument’. 
                                                 
36 G Davies, ‘Welfare as a Service’, 29 Legal Issues of Economic Integration (2002) 27, 29-30.  
37 Case C-76/05 Schwarz, EU:C:2007:492, para 39. 
38 Davies, op. cit. supra note 36, 32. 
39 Ibid., 35. 
40 Ibid., 34-35. 
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It is this argument which seems conceptually most closely connected to ‘remuneration’. 
For this reason alone, it is presumably the most interesting and promising one. Consequently, 
it deserves to be addressed in more detail. Davies undertakes an elaborate attempt to 
conceptually distinguish education from health care depending on how funding is organised. 
With an emphasis on the transaction aspect, Davies argues that a service is provided for 
remuneration when a private insurance company pays for a hospital but also if, for example, 
the state pays a private company in order to provide a specific service. Under these 
circumstances a service will undoubtedly be offered for remuneration. Also, a service is 
provided for remuneration when the state specifically ‘sells’ this service to the public.41  
In the context of health care we find a specific version of the transaction problem. In 
the English case of Watts,42 the Court found – in line with its earlier case law – free movement 
law to be applicable; the English National Health Service (NHS) is tax funded and delivers its 
services free of charge.43 The Court in its legal reasoning in Watts focussed exclusively on the 
cross-border dimension of the transaction, that is, a patient pays a health care provider directly 
in another Member State and is then reimbursed by the system of affiliation.44 In other words, 
the private individual is reimbursed by the state. This in turn allowed the Court to come to the 
conclusion that there was no need in the case of Watts ‘to determine whether the provision of 
hospital treatment in the context of a national health service such as the NHS is in itself a 
service within the meaning of those provisions’.45 Accordingly, Spaventa accuses the Court of 
                                                 
41 G Davies, ‘The Process and Side-Effects of Harmonisation of European Welfare States’ (2006) Jean Monnet 
Working Paper No 02/06 (2006) 17. 
42 The case of Watts was about an English patient who jumped the NHS waiting lists and went to France in order 
to receive a hip replacement. 
43 On the organisation of the NHS see C Newdick, Who Should We Treat? Rights, Rationing, and Resources in 
the NHS, 2nd ed. (Oxford University Press 2005) Chapter 4. 
44 Cf. W Gekiere, R Baeten and W Palm, ‘Free Movement of Services in the EU and Health Care’, in E 
Mossialos et al. (eds), Health Systems Governance in Europe: The Role of European Union Law and Policy 
(Cambridge University Press 2010) 461, 467.  
45 Watts, op. cit. supra note 31, para 91. 
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using a ‘hermeneutic “trick”.’46 Watts clearly shows that attempts of conceptualising the 
Court’s case law along the lines of textualism does not deliver convincing results. It is therefore 
necessary to find an alternative approach which provides more persuasive answers. 
 
LAW AS INTEGRITY 
It is submitted that law as integrity offers a promising alternative in order to conceptualise the 
case law of the Court. Dworkin explains the character of integrity through an analogy in which 
novelists meet in order to write a chain novel. Each of the novelists involved in this project is 
responsible to write one specific section or chapter of that novel. They are only able to do this 
in a meaningful way, if they interpret the story that has been written so far.47 Their task but 
also their technique compares with the one applied by a common law judge48 who needs to 
engage with history as a consequence of the practice of stare decisis.49 The judge 
must interpret what has gone before because he has a responsibility to advance 
the enterprise in hand rather than strike out in some new direction of his own. 
So he must determine, according to his own judgment, what the earlier 
decisions come to, what the point or theme of the practice so far, taken as a 
whole, really is.50 
 
Looking at the problem from this perspective one question to ask is whether health care 
and education share similar historical ‘chains of law’51 and are therefore at all comparable to 
                                                 
46 E Spaventa, Free Movement of Persons in the European Union: Barriers to Movement in Their Constitutional 
Context (Kluwer Law International 2008) 56. 
47 R Dworkin, ‘Law as Interpretation’, 9 Critical Inquiry (1982) 179, 193. 
48 Dworkin applies the concept of integrity also in relation to statutory and constitutional law: Dworkin, supra n. 
13, Chapters 9 and 10. 
49 S Herschovitz, ‘Integrity and Stare Decisis’ in S Herschovitz (ed.), Exploring Law’s Empire. The 
Jurisprudence of Ronald Dworkin (Oxford University Press 2006) 103, 104. 
50 Dworkin, op. cit. supra note 47, 193-194. 
51 Dworkin, op. cit. supra note 13, 228. 
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or relevant for each other in the context of integrity. The legal history regarding the migration 
of patients in EU law shows that Chapter 1 of Regulation No 3/58, which belonged to the first 
laws ever passed by what was then the European Economic Community, had already included 
laws regulating the cross-border movement of patients.52 The legal basis of Regulation No 3/58 
was Article 51 EEC53 (now Article 48 TFEU) whose aim was to facilitate the free movement 
of workers by providing them with social security. Welfare in general and health care in 
particular therefore constitute an ‘accessory’ to the internal market. Hence the law is an 
acknowledgement of the special nature of the free movement of workers with its social 
dimension.54 
In comparison, the legal history of education has developed differently. Originally there 
was neither any mentioning of education in the Treaty nor was education covered by secondary 
legislation.55 At first sight, it may be somehow surprising that neither primary nor secondary 
EU law deemed it necessary to bring together education and the internal market. Yet at the 
beginning of European integration the value of knowledge (Wissensgesellschaft) for the 
individual and a society was not as obvious and compelling as it is today.56 In fact, it was the 
field of agriculture – evidenced by the Common Agricultural Policy – which was considered 
to be the most prominent economic factor.57 In the light of this development it does not come 
                                                 
52 Verordnung Nr 3/58 (EWG) vom 16. Dezember 1958 über die Soziale Sicherheit von Wanderarbeitnehmern 
(ABl 1958, 30/561, text only available in DE, FR, IT, NL) Kapitel 1. 
53 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Rome 25 March 1957. 
54 Cf P C de Sousa, The European Fundamental Freedoms. A Contextual Approach (Oxford University Press 
2015) 68-71. 
55 A P van der Mei, Free Movement of Persons within the European Community. Cross-Border Access to Public 
Benefits (Hart Publishing 2003) 333. 
56 Cf U Beck, Risk Society. Towards a New Modernity (Sage 1992; transl. by M Ritter) 46-48. 
57 A Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe. Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht (Cornell 
University Press 1998) 89 (Table 2.2). 
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as a surprise that the Maastricht Treaty finally included Article 126.1 TEU58 [now Article 165.1 
TFEU] which specifically addresses the issue of (higher) education.  
 The analysis seems to have reached a point where it is possible to bring together the 
different threads and provide a preliminary answer to the question which stood at the beginning 
of this first part: is health care a service provided for remuneration? Clearly the analysis of the 
legal history showed that health care has received considerable attention by the EU legislator 
already from the beginning of European integration. As suggested, one of the earliest pieces of 
secondary legislation covered aspects of cross-border movement of patients even if only as an 
accessory to and in order to improve the functioning of the internal market. In comparison, 
education (legally) had a somewhat slow(er) start than health care.59 Therefore, it would appear 
– from the perspective of integrity – that a different treatment of education and health care is 
justifiable.  
 And yet, when it comes to integrity, it is not enough to simply ‘look back’ in time. It is 
also necessary to ‘look across’ and examine as to whether there exists consistency horizontally 
in relation to the relevant principles, that is, ‘across the range of the legal standards the 
community now enforces’.60 The point which therefore needs to be developed further in this 
article is whether the Court’s activity in the field of health care has created some incoherence 
with the established principles. The framework of reference which will be used is based on the 
principles of integration and coordination. Only once consistency of these principles is 
established horizontally, is it possible to have a satisfactory answer to the question, which is at 
                                                 
58 Treaty on European Union [1992] O.J. 191/23. 
59 van der Mei, op. cit. supra note 55, 340-347. 
60 Dworkin, op. cit. supra note 13, 227. 
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the centre of this article: did the judges of the ECJ behave in an Herculean manner and read EU 
health care law in the best possible light? 
  
2. The Principle of Coordination 
 
The characteristic of the principle of coordination is that it preserves the substance of 
boundaries, but additionally seeks to make boundaries more permeable. One consequence of 
the preservation of boundaries is that the authority of Member States, which is to be found 
within these boundaries, remains.61 From a constitutional perspective therefore it can be argued 
that integration, which will be discussed in more detail below, is linked to sovereignty and the 
authority to act,62 whereas coordination impacts only on the autonomy, that is, the capacity to 
act.63 Coordination can be categorised into perfect and imperfect coordination. The cases of 
Pierik64 suggest that perfect coordination and integration can come rather close in terms of 
their effects.  
In the two Pierik cases the Court interpreted a predecessor version of Article 20 
Regulation No 883/2004, that is, Article 22.2 Regulation No 1408/7165 which stipulated that 
‘[t]he authorisation required … may not be refused where the treatment in question cannot be 
                                                 
61 Cf. A Hurrell, ‘International Law and the Making and Unmaking of Boundaries’ in A Buchanan and M 
Moore (eds.), States, National, and Borders. The Ethics of Making Boundaries (Cambridge University Press 
2003) 275, 279. 
62 S Leibfried and P Pierson, ‘Semisovereign Welfare States: Social Policy in a Multitiered Europe’, in S 
Leibfried and P Pierson (eds.), European Social Policy. Between Fragmentation and Integration (The 
Brookings Institution 1995) 43, 44. 
63 Cf. K A Armstrong, Governing Social Inclusion. Europeanization through Policy Coordination (Oxford 
University Press 2010) 41. 
64 Case 117/77 Pierik, EU:C:1978:72; Case 182/78 Pierik (No 2), EU:C:1979:142. 
65 Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 of the Council of 14 June 1971 on the Application of Social Security Schemes 
to Employed Persons and their Families Moving within the Community, English Special Edition: Series I 
Chapter 1971(II) 416.  
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provided for the person concerned within the territory of the Member State in which he resides.’ 
The ECJ, when interpreting the wording of that said norm concluded that it would cover two 
scenarios: first, the treatment which is provided in the destination state is ‘more effective’66 
than the one available in the home state. Secondly, a particular treatment is unavailable in the 
home state altogether. One consequence of the Court’s interpretation of the norm was that 
patients were given access to the best treatment available in Europe.  
The Court justified its interpretation of the relevant provision by arguing ‘that it was 
the intention of the regulation to give medical requirements a decisive role’.67 I do not intend 
to discuss the problems related with intentional interpretation.68 Member States responded to 
the Court’s ruling by amending Article 22 of Regulation 1408/71. They added two criteria, the 
primary aim of which was to regulate the impact the health care framework of the EU has on 
national systems. Member States clarified that authorisation to patients only has to be given for 
treatment which is ‘among the benefits provided’ (vector of treatment) and if provided, ‘within 
the time normally necessary for obtaining the treatment in question in the Member State of 
residence, taking account of his current state of health and the probable course of the disease’69 
(vector of time). 
While secondary EU law allows for authorisation which is an essential feature of 
coordination, Article 56 TFEU stipulates that ‘[w]ithin the framework of the provisions set out 
below, restrictions on freedom to provide services within the Union shall be prohibited.’70 Yet 
even the free movement provisions of the Treaty do not entitle patients to exit their system of 
                                                 
66 Case 117/77, Pierik, EU:C:1978:72, para 22. 
67 Case 182/78, Pierik (No 2), EU:C:1979:142, para 12 (emphasis added). 
68 J Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford University Press 1999) Chapter 6. 
69 Article 22.2 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2793/81 of 17 September 1981 amending Regulation (EEC) No 
1408/71 on the application of social security schemes to employed persons and their families moving within the 
Community and Regulation (EEC) No 574/72 fixing the procedure for implementing Regulation (EEC) No 
1408/71.  
70 Emphasis added. 
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affiliation under all circumstances. Member States remain entitled to put in place certain 
restrictions of free movement law. According to Article 52 TFEU, derogations are possible 
based on public policy, public security or public health. In addition, the Court has developed 
‘mandatory requirements’ which provide grounds of justifications in order to limit the free 
movement law.71 The difficult question that remains, however, is to establish what type of 
regulatory framework constitutes an acceptable or legitimate restriction on freedom?  
In order to develop a legitimate balance of such a framework the Court usually draws 
on the principle of proportionality. The principle needs to address the impact the framework of 
the EU has on waiting lists and the scope of treatment. In health care it is the concept of 
solidarity which is ‘submitted to one or the other version of a proportionality test’.72 The aim 
of proportionality is to protect specifically recognised interests.73 The principle of 
proportionality is especially useful because it allows to balance ‘a liberal rights-based 
constitutional rationality with a strong commitment to a welfare state’.74 Yet the essential 
problem with the proportionality test is that the various versions of it are all based on an ‘open-
ended formula’.75 Therefore, the proportionality test is sometimes considered to simply conceal 
political decisions behind a veil of verbose, albeit substantively weak, legal reasoning.76 In 
order to establish whether the Court upheld the principle of coordination to a similar degree in 
comparison to the Regulation, the pivotal question to consider is how the proportionality test 
deals with the two critical parameters of time and treatment.  
                                                 
71 D Chalmers et al., European Union Law, 3rd ed. (Cambridge University Press 2014) 899-901. 
72 Somek, supra n. 18, 6. 
73 G de Búrca, ‘The Principle of Proportionality and its Application in EC Law’, 13 Yearbook of European Law 
(1993) 105, 106. 
74 T-I Harbo, ‘The Function of the Proportionality Principle in the EU’, 16 European Law Journal (2010) 158. 
75 G Conway, The Limits of Legal Reasoning and the European Court of Justice (Cambridge University Press 
2012) 218. 
76 Sousa, op. cit. supra note 54, 45. 
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THE VECTOR OF TIME 
In relation to the first parameter, that is, ‘waiting times’ the Court in Inizan77 interpreted Article 
22.2 of Regulation No 1408/71 with reference to and in analogy with the cases Geraets-Smits 
and Peerbooms78 as well as Müller-Fauré and Van Riet;79 all of which addressed ‘time’ in the 
context of the Treaty. Advocate General Villalón in the very recent case of Elchinov reasoned 
that since the Court repeats the same statement of law, irrespectively of whether it is dealing 
with a case based on the Treaty or the Regulation, the only sensible conclusion to be drawn is 
that it ‘[is] placing the interpretation of the Treaty and the interpretation of secondary law on 
an equal footing in case-law.’80  
Arguably, in a rather unusual way the ECJ filled the ‘open-ended formula’ of the 
proportionality test by drawing on lex specialis, i.e. Regulation, which thereby became a 
‘controlling factor’.81 Because the Court cannot rule out, as will be argued subsequently, that 
EU health care law impacts on the national systems, it fills the gaps with existing secondary 
law and thereby upholds the integrity of the law. Thus, the Court ensured that it transferred the 
principle of coordination, which is in operation in the context of the Regulation, as approximate 
as possible from the Regulation context, into the Treaty context. According to Article 20.2 of 
Regulation No 883/2004 the maximum waiting time is based on whatever is ‘medically 
justifiable’ which seems however, to limit the authority of Member States. 
                                                 
77 Case C-56/01, Inizan, EU:C:2003:578.  
78 Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms, op. cit. supra note 25, para 103. 
79 Case C-385/99, Müller-Faurè and Van Riet, EU:C:2003:270, para 89. 
80 A.G. Villalón, Case C-173/09, Elchinov, EU:C:2010:336, para 77; cf. also A.G. Geelhoed, C-372/04, Watts, 
EU:C:2005:784, para 101; he was followed by the Court in the subsequent judgment (paras 60-64); but see van 
der Mei writing a few years earlier (supra n. 55) 305. 
81 Conway, supra n. 75, 275. 
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Yet, the question of whether a specific treatment is ‘medically justifiable’ constitutes 
no longer a problem of interpretation but, if we apply MacCormick’s framework, one of 
‘classification’.82 This finding goes beyond pure semantics because the question whether 
specific factual circumstances fit a described class, transforms a problem of interpretation into 
one of fact.83 While generally a court needs to make a decision about facts and law in one 
judgment, in the EU context we encounter a strict ‘division of functions’84 between the national 
courts and the ECJ. This means that the ECJ at most wields the authority of persuasion to 
impose its preferences on Member States. 85  
In the Dutch case of Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms the specific treatment in question 
was not covered by national insurance rules. According to the Dutch decree on sickness 
insurance benefits in kind, medical and surgical care, the treatment provided by a general 
practitioner and a specialist is only covered if it is considered ‘normal in the professional circles 
concerned’.86 There are two ways how to interpret the word ‘normal’ in this context: it can be 
understood either with reference to the ‘national’ or alternatively ‘international’ medical 
circles.87 While the Court accepted that the phrase in question ‘[was] open to a number of 
interpretations’,88 it concluded nevertheless that it needed to be interpreted as ‘sufficiently tried 
and tested by international medical science’.89 If the relevant norm were to be interpreted in a 
way that it only covers ‘treatment habitually carried out on national territory and scientific 
                                                 
82 N MacCormick, Rhetoric and the Rule of Law. A Theory of Legal Reasoning (Oxford University Press 2005) 
43. 
83 Ibid., 141- 142. 
84 G Davies, ‘Activism Relocated. The Self-Restraint of the European Court of Justice in its National Context’, 
19 Journal of European Public Policy (2012) 76, 78.  
85 Ibid., 79. 
86 Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms, op. cit. supra note 25, para 10 (emphasis added). 
87 Ibid., paras 96-97. 
88 Ibid., para 92. 
89 Ibid, para 94 (empahsis added); also C Kopetzki, ‘Behandlung auf dem “Stand der Wissenschaft” ’ in W J 
Pfeil (ed.), Finazielle Grenzen des Behandlungsanspruches (MANZ 2010) 9, 14. 
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views prevailing in national medical circles to determine what is or is not normal’,90 it would 
be quite likely that generally Dutch providers were to be preferred. While the effects of the 
Court’s judgment seem to fall along the correct lines, its reasoning – based on the language of 
discrimination – does not persuade fully.  
A better approach seems the one chosen by Advocate General Colomer who rejects any 
of the territorial references by arguing that ‘[t]he criterion of what is normal in professional 
circles, … is determined on objective medical grounds and without regard to the place where 
the treatment is provided.’91 The gist of the reasoning of the Advocate General also resonates 
in the submission by the Dutch Government which was of the opinion, and this may come with 
little surprise, that ‘professional opinion in the Netherlands is also based on the state of the art 
and on scientific thinking at international level and depends on whether, in the light of the state 
of national and international science, the treatment is regarded as normal treatment’.92  One 
reason as to why the judges may have invoked the language of discrimination may be a 
consequence of the fact that the ECJ cannot rule on the meaning of national law, whereas the 
issue of discrimination gives them a better handle on the substance. 
 
THE VECTOR OF TREATMENT 
With regard to the second factor, scope of treatment, the Court held on more than one occasion 
that EU law ‘cannot, in principle, have the effect of requiring a Member State to extend such 
lists of medical benefits.’93 Consequently, ‘the fact that a particular type of medical treatment 
                                                 
90 Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms, op. cit. supra note 25, para 96 (emphasis added). 
91 A.G. Colomer, op. cit. supra note 30, para 43 (emphasis added). 
92 Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms, op. cit. supra note 25, para 93 (emphasis added). 
93 For example: Case C-173/09 Elchinov, EU:C:2010:581, para 58 (emphasis added). 
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is covered or not covered by the sickness insurance schemes of other Member States is 
irrelevant in this regard’.94 Both statements of the Court suggest that the EU health care 
framework is rather deferential to national law. The Court, in Müller-Faurè and Van Riet, 
echoed this finding when it held that the ‘achievement of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed 
by the Treaty inevitably requires Member States to make some adjustments to their national 
systems of social security. It does not follow that this would undermine their sovereign powers 
in this field.’95  
In this context the Bulgarian case of Elchinov is of interest. The Bulgarian health care 
system offers a mix between definitive lists of covered benefits but also describes what 
constitutes such benefits in rather generic wording.96 Mr Elchinov, having been diagnosed with 
a malignant oncological disease, requested authorisation from the competent Bulgarian 
authority in order to receive treatment in a specialist clinic in Germany. The considerable 
advantage of the treatment in Germany was that Mr Elchinov’s eye was saved. The relevant 
section of the Bulgarian health insurance law stipulates that treatment covered by the public 
health care system includes in No 136 ‘other operations on the eyeball’ and in No 258 ‘high 
technology radiotherapy for oncological and non-oncological conditions’.  
In a preliminary ruling to the ECJ the Bulgarian national court wanted to know, among 
other things, whether the fact that this specific, less invasive, treatment offered in Germany, 
not available in Bulgaria, yet covered by Bulgarian national law, would qualify as ‘treatment 
in question’ in accordance with what was then Article 22.2 of Regulation 1408/71. The Court 
in Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms had already held that ‘treatment in question’ refers to ‘the 
                                                 
94 Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms, op. cit. supra note 25, para 87 (emphasis added). 
95 Müller-Faurè and Van Riet, op. cit. supra note 79, para 102 (emphasis added). 
96 A.G. Villalón, op. cit. supra note 80, para 60. 
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same or equally effective treatment’.97 Consequently, if Bulgarian national law, as was the case 
in Elchinov, decides to cover less invasive treatment, arguably, the more ‘effective treatment’ 
– this means that the more invasive treatment actually available in Bulgaria – can no longer be 
considered to amount to the ‘treatment in question’. Whether the treatment is more effective, 
however, is ultimately a question of fact. Thus again, this means that the ECJ does not have the 
authority to make a decision.  
Nevertheless, the Bulgarian case appears to constitute an example where an increase in 
national solidarity is required as a consequence of EU law, that is, as a consequence of the 
interpretation of what constitutes ‘treatment in question’. Yet a different, more accurate, 
interpretation of the legal practice seems to be that the Bulgarian legislator can simply adjust 
the law to its realities and remove from the list of covered treatments the wording ‘other 
operations on the eyeball’ and ‘high-technology radiotherapy for oncological and non-
oncological conditions’ if the health care system only intends to offer treatment which amounts 
to a complete removal of the eyeball (‘enucleation’).98 Therefore it seems obvious that the 
Bulgarian legislator has retained its authority. 
Davies has made the observation that often because of the direct application of free 
movement rights of the Treaty they can provide a useful and powerful tool for the court to 
foster integration ‘where secondary legislation does exist, but does not grant the rights 
desired’.99 At least in the field of health care this finding is not supported. In fact, the conclusion 
must be the other way around. The examples studied suggest that the Court draws on secondary 
                                                 
97 Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms, op.cit. supra note 25, para 103. 
98 AP van der Mei, ‘Case C-512/08, Commission v. France, Judgment of the European Court of Justice (Grand 
Chamber) of 5 October 2010, nyr, and Case C-173/09, Georgi Ivanov Elchinov v. 
Natsionalnadravnoosiguritelna kasa, Judgment of the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) of 5 October 2010, 
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legislation as a form of lex specialis. The Regulation covering free movement of patients in 
relation to the proportionality test in particular is used in order to interpret the more general 
law, that is, the Treaty. With regard to the integrity of law it can be concluded that the Court 
has invoked the Regulation even in the context of the Treaty and thus applies existing principles 
consistently. In other words, the degree of coordination is the same in the context of the 
Regulation and the Treaty. Finally, the discussion turns to the most controversial aspect of EU 
health care law, namely the integration of health care systems and the question of how this can 
be justified by a Herculean judge. 
 
3. The Principle of Integration 
 
Above it has been argued above that education and health care come from a different chain of 
EU law and also that health care law coordinates, whereas education integrates systems. 
However, to the extent that the Court removes any barriers to free movement of patients, 
arguably, health care is based on the principle of integration. And yet it would appear that there 
remains a difference between integration in health care and education. Integration in education 
has abolished the boundaries of membership, whereas integration in health care has only 
abolished the functional boundaries of health care systems. Therefore it does not come as a 
surprise that that education is no longer based on the law on free movement of services but on 
non-discrimination/citizenship law, whereas health care law is still exclusively driven by the 
law on free movement of services.100  
                                                 
100 Cf A Somek, Individualism. An Essay on the Authority of the European Union (Oxford University Press 
2008) 201-204.  
22 
 
Thus, it is still necessary to establish whether the principle of coordination can be 
accommodated with the principle of integration as developed by the Court in health care. In 
the discussion about coordination in health care, the requirement of authorisation constitutes a 
focal point because depending on its nature it can either preserve or undermine the integrity of 
existing boundaries. This in turn then either fosters or hinders integration. While boundaries or 
the ruins of them are not necessarily an absolute barrier to free movement, they are nevertheless 
an obstacle to it. It therefore comes with little surprise that the ECJ considered the legal 
requirement of prior authorisation – imposed on patients who intend to undergo health care 
treatment in another EU Member State – to constitute a restriction on free movement of services 
which can only be upheld if justifiable.101  
In this context an oddity regarding the qualification of what constitutes an obstacle to 
free movement law needs to be examined. While for some types of treatment, i.e. non-hospital 
treatment, the Court found national laws, which require prior authorisation, to be in conflict 
with the Treaty, it refused to come to the same conclusion in relation to secondary EU law, i.e. 
Article 20.2 of Regulation 883/2004. The Court tried to justify the difference by arguing that 
Article 42 EC Treaty (now Article 48 TFEU), which is the legal basis for Regulation 883/2004, 
‘does not prohibit the Community legislature from attaching conditions to the rights and 
advantages which it accords in order to ensure freedom of movement for workers.’102 Yet one 
would think that the requirement of prior authorisation in health care amounts either to a 
violation of the free movement principle, or it does not.103  
                                                 
101 Kohll, op. cit. supra note 8, paras 31-36.  
102 Inizan, op. cit. supra note 77, para 23. 
103 P Cabral, ‘The Internal Market and the Right to Cross Border Medical Care’, 29 European Law Review 
(2004) 673, 679. 
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It appears that Cabral’s conclusion is less compelling if one analyses the matter from 
the perspective of the ‘no-impact-approximation’; by this I mean that the health care framework 
of the EU has no or rather limited impact on the national health care systems. Needless to say, 
that the nature of legal reasoning becomes now consequentialist.104 Article 20 Regulation No 
883/2004 reimburses patients in accordance with the tariffs of the Member State where the 
patient receives the treatment.105 This can create either more or fewer costs for the Member 
State of affiliation but is counterbalanced, it is submitted, by the requirement for authorisation. 
Thus Member States, it has been argued, retain formally the legal authority of making the 
decision even if their autonomy to act may in fact be rather limited because the terms and 
conditions are predetermined – to a considerable degree – by the supranational level.  
 
THE STATE OF PARETO-EFFICIENCY 
The situation is different when it comes to the application of the Treaty. In Kohll the Court held 
that national laws which stipulate the need for prior authorisation are in conflict with the 
Treaty.106 Thus Member States have lost the formal authority to grant permission. It is argued, 
that to the extent Member States have lost the formal legal authority to decide, this can only be 
justified if the migration of patients does not violate the no-impact-approximation. In other 
words, nobody is made worse off and at least one person, here the patient, is better off because 
                                                 
104 Cf. M-B Dembour, Who Believes in Human Rights? Reflections on the European Convention (Cambridge 
University Press 2006) 78. 
105 Article 20.2 of Regulation No 883/2004: ‘An insured person who is authorised by the competent institution 
to go to another Member State with the purpose of receiving the treatment appropriate to his/her condition shall 
receive the benefits in kind provided, on behalf of the competent institution, by the institution of the place of 
stay, in accordance with the provisions of the legislation it applies, as though he/she were insured under the said 
legislation.’ 
106 Kohll, op. cit. supra note 8, para 54. 
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of the Court’s intervention.107 Pareto-efficiency embodies another important demand of 
integrity, namely that a government has ‘equal concern’ for the treatment of its citizens.108 It 
may be disputed, from an empirical perspective, whether the case actually achieves this result 
but it is nevertheless important to note that both the Court and the Advocate General seem to 
make their arguments in this contextual framework. 
Clearly, Advocate General Tesauro made reference to the possible effects EU health 
care law, based on free movement of services, could have on national solidarity and found: 
‘[t]he only effect I can conceive of is that … [the] orthodontist established in the same State 
[Luxembourg] will have lost one patient. It is therefore the individual practitioners who are 
adversely affected and not the system itself.’109 The Court followed its Advocate General and 
added that ‘it is clear that reimbursement of the costs of dental treatment provided in other 
Member States in accordance with the tariff of the State of insurance has no significant effect 
on the financing of the social security system’.110 
The Court in its consequentialist reasoning in health care also acknowledged the 
necessity for an ‘overall approach’. The judges considered it to be ‘self-evident that assuming 
the cost of one isolated case of treatment, carried out in a Member State other than that in which 
a particular person is insured with a sickness fund, can never make any significant impact on 
the financing of the social security system.’111 The Court thereby seemed to pursue an 
altogether different strategy in health care in comparison to the doctrine of ‘unreasonable 
                                                 
107 Cf M Maduro, We the Court: The European Court of Justice and the European Economic Constitution (Hart 
Publishing 1998) 152. 
108 Dworkin, op. cit. supra note 13, 222. 
109 A.G. Tesauro, op. cit. supra note 22, FN 90 (emphasis added). 
110 Kohll, op. cit. supra note 8, para 42 (emphasis added). 
111 Müller-Faurè and Van Riet, op. cit. supra note 79, para 74. 
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financial burden’112 which it had applied in education cases such as Baumbast113 and 
Grzelczyk.114 The obvious criticism raised against the Court then was that the micro-level 
findings were simply scaled up to the macro-level when the kernel of the problem would be 
that ‘one Baumbast and one Grzelczyk cannot really constitute an unreasonable burden upon 
the public purse – but ten-thousand Baumbasts and ten-thousand Grzelczyks might well have 
some more appreciable effect on the welfare resources of the host state.’115  
While the Court was of the opinion that free movement of patients would have no 
considerable effects on solidarity in the context of non-hospital care, it reached a different 
conclusion in relation to hospital care. The judges assumed that ‘[i]t is well known that the 
number of hospitals, their geographical distribution, the way in which they are organised and 
the facilities with which they are provided, and even the nature of the medical services which 
they are able to offer, are all matters for which planning must be possible.’116 The Court 
consequently accepted, without the need for further detailed evidence,117 that the requirement 
of authorisation constitutes a necessary tool in order to control costs but also avoid wastage of 
resources.118  
And yet critics of the Court are nevertheless of the opinion that free movement of 
patients would amount to the ‘Killing of National Health and Insurance Systems’ or the 
‘Corroding [of] Social Solidarity.’119 The issue is important and therefore needs to be studied 
                                                 
112 What is created as a consequence of this imprecision is a paradox: cf TA O Endicott, Vagueness in Law 
(Oxford University Press 2000) 33-36. 
113 Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk, EU:C:2001:458. 
114 Case C-413/99 Baumbast, EU:C:2002:493. 
115 M Dougan and E Spaventa, ‘Educating Rudy and the non-English Patient: a Double Bill on Residency Rights 
under Article 18 EC’, 28 European Law Review (2003) 699, 707.  
116 Müller-Faurè and Van Riet, op. cit. supra note 79, para 77. 
117 Cf N N Shuibhne and M Maci, ‘Proving Public Interest: The Growing Impact of Evidence in Free Movement 
Case Law’, 50 Common Market Law Review (2013) 965, 997-998. 
118 Müller-Faurè and Van Riet, op. cit. supra note 79, para 80. 
119 See for detailed references: E Szyszczak, ‘Patients’ Rights: A Lost Cause or a Missed Opportunity’, in J W 
van de Gronden et al. (eds), Health Care and EU Law (TMC Asser Press 2011) 103, 110. 
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in more detail. The gist of the argument critics make is based on the planning argument. 
According to them the case law of the Court undermined Member States’ ability to assign 
resources and control costs through, e.g., the use of waiting lists.120 The Court, through its 
focus on the individual patient ignores, so argue the critics, the ‘opportunity costs’ which 
accumulate whenever limited resources are used in one way instead of another.121 The reasons 
for their scepticism may also have to do with the fact that in the real world there are relatively 
few Pareto-superior situations.122 Nevertheless, in the remainder of this Chapter it will be 
argued that their concerns appear to be unfounded for two reasons.  
 
THE ANOMALY OF THE EXCEPTION 
In contrast to critics of the Court it is argued that patients, while being on a waiting list, can 
develop additional health conditions which can increase the overall ‘costs-per-patient.’ And 
yet quite possibly only some of these additional costs will exclusively affect the health care 
budget, whereas other costs will simply be externalised to other budget posts, such as welfare, 
or alternatively they are ‘privatised’, e.g. to the members of a family who takes care of a 
patient. Furthermore, poor health of a population, due to long waiting lists, can even have 
macro-economic consequences because a population becomes, for example, overall less 
productive.123 In van Riet the Court made reference especially to this point when it argued that 
                                                 
120 C Newdick, ‘Citizenship, Free Movement and Health Care: Cementing Individual Rights by Corroding 
Social Solidarity’, 43 Common Market Law Review (2006) 1645, 1661-1664. 
121 C Newdick, ‘The European Court of Justice, Transnational Health Care, and Social Citizenship – Accidental 
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122 S Guest, Ronald Dworkin 3rd ed. (Stanford University Press 2013) 151. 
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‘the degree of pain or the nature of the patient’s disability … might, for example, make it 
impossible or extremely difficult for him [the patient] to carry out a professional activity’.124  
Without developing these points fully, this much is obvious: if one does not take 
adequately into account the costs of waiting lists, this necessarily distorts the findings made in 
relation to opportunity costs. Consequently not each and every shortening of waiting lists 
necessarily amounts to increased costs of a health care system. And yet, there obviously comes 
a point, however difficult to locate, where a health care system with longer waiting times is 
cheaper to run in comparison with a system that operates with shorter waiting lists. It is then 
that the no-impact-approximation, as outlined above, is violated because Member States find 
themselves in a situation in which unless they pour more funds into the system – which 
increases the quantity of solidarity – some other patients will have to live with extended 
waiting times and this will impact on their welfare. 
A different way of looking at the same issue would be that there comes a point where 
EU health care law has used up all its ‘efficiency-savings’ which means that either more 
solidarity is needed or EU health care law is beginning to have an impact on how national 
health care systems have to be  managed. The probability for this scenario to happen increases 
the broader the anomaly of integration is defined. The rarity of Pareto-superior circumstances 
may have been one contributing factor for the Court to decide upon abolishing the requirement 
of prior authorisation only in relation to non-hospital treatment.125 This marks the second 
reason as to why the argument of the critics is of limited persuasiveness. It would appear that 
                                                 
124 Müller-Faurè and Van Riet, op. cit. supra note 79, para 90 (emphasis added). 
125 Cf also Somek, op. cit. supra note 100, 208-211. 
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the conceptual approach of the Court upholds the idea of equality, namely, that the rights of 
those who wish to exit are not taken more seriously by the ECJ than those who do not.126 
However, one obvious consequence of the Court’s case law was that it became 
necessary to distinguish between hospital care and non-hospital care which is, however, 
difficult to do at times. The Court drew the following line: ‘certain services provided in a 
hospital environment but also capable of being provided by a practitioner in his surgery or in a 
health centre could for that reason be placed on the same footing as non-hospital services.’127 
This approach suggests, without offering absolute clarity, that the decisive criterion regarding 
hospital treatment did not necessarily depend on where the treatment took place but where the 
treatment could have taken place.  
The new Directive 2011/24, which regulates aspects of cross-border movement of 
patients, continues to distinguish between treatment for which prior authorisation is imperative 
and treatment for which no authorisation is needed. According to Article 8.2 of the Directive 
the requirement of prior authorisation may be ‘limited’ (which could be understood as a cynical 
choice of word) to treatment which ‘involves overnight hospital accommodation of the patient 
in question for at least one night’ or (alternatively) which ‘requires use of highly specialised 
and cost-intensive medical infrastructure or medical equipment.’ To what extent this second 
aspect leaves room for interpretation can be seen if one compares the Opinions of the Advocate 
Generals Bot and Sharpston in the cases Hartlauer128 and Commission v France.129  
In Hartlauer, Advocate General Bot chose a rather extensive reading of hospital 
treatment. He considered even dental care, if it goes beyond most basic care (e.g. plaque 
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control or polishing) and requires some qualified staff,130 to amount to hospital treatment. In 
turn, for Advocate General Sharpston the decisive parameter whether a certain treatment 
qualifies as hospital treatment or not depends on the costs of the equipment involved in the 
treatment.131 Clearly, Advocate General Sharpston seems to prefer a slightly narrower 
understanding of what constitutes hospital treatment if compared to Advocate General Bot. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to notice a tendency that has developed over time which appears to 
limit the circumstances when a patient is entitled to treatment in another Member State without 
the need for authorisation.132 Overall Advocate General Sharpston’s cost-focussed approach 
appears to be conceptually preferable because it is in line with the no-impact approximation 
and the Court seems to follow.133 Overall it seems that the anomaly of integration created by 
the Court has been gradually reduced in its scope.  
To conclude: the abolition of the authorisation mechanism constitutes an anomaly 
which has led to the integration of health care systems by abolishing functional boundaries. 
However, in contrast to education, in health care the membership boundaries have remained 
intact. The relationship between the coordination and integration in health care can be 
accommodated with the no-impact-approximation: the framework of the EU work must not 
have any (significant) impact on the quantity of national solidarity. The narrowing down or 
fine tuning of the anomaly of integration in the Court’s case law is an acknowledgement of the 
difficulties to firmly establish, that is, beyond pure speculation, to what extent integration of 
health care systems has an effect on national solidarity. The Court thereby operates with the 
following approximation: the cheaper the treatment involved in cross-border health care, the 
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less likely the migration of patients has any impact on the quantity or degree of national 
solidarity 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Over the last decade or so the law on cross-border movement of patients has gained some 
momentum. One critical factor in this development has been the Court. The interpretation of 
the law on the free movement of services resulted in its application in the field of migration of 
patients. In reaction to its jurisprudence the Court has faced some considerable criticism over 
the years. The aim of this article was therefore to undertake a (re-)appraisal of this criticism 
through an in-depth conceptual analysis of the Court’s legal reasoning. The approach chosen 
for this article was based on Dworkin’s conceptual idea which treats law as integrity. 
Consequently it was necessary to examine and accommodate the ‘consistency’ of the Court’s 
treatment of the education cases in relation to health care. Furthermore, it became also 
necessary to examine the consistency of the two strands of health care law, namely secondary 
EU law, here in particular Regulation 883/2004, and the case law which is based on the Treaty.  
The argument made was that there are no conflicting principles at work between health 
care and education. In contrast to health care, and based on vertical consistency, education was 
not an area which was regulated in some way by EU law. This is very much in contrast to 
health care which was considered important for the functioning of the internal market and also 
suggests that free movement of people is somewhat different from the other free movement 
laws. It is a relatively recent development that education, broadly understood, is important for 
the functioning of the internal market. However, the consequence of this observation is that the 
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chains of law in health care and education are different in their character and the law on 
education does not predetermine the ‘fit’ for health care.  
The other dimension, that is, horizontal consistency, was established between the 
principles upheld by the Regulation and those of the Treaty. The Court applied the ‘open-
ended-formula’ of the proportionality test in a rather unusual way. As such the Court filled the 
vague terms of the proportionality test with the relevant provisions of Regulation 883/2004. In 
this way the Court made sure to achieve the correct level of restriction/coordination between 
the different health care systems and consequently achieved horizontal consistency. To the 
extent the Court abolished boundaries through free movement of services and integrated 
systems it did so in a rather limited way. Despite the fact that the Court integrated systems, 
which would normally mean that Member states lose their authority, it only allowed this to the 
extent that circumstances change from Pareto-inefficient to Pareto-efficient. Thus, even if the 
judges of the ECJ sit in rather mundane Luxembourg and not on top of the more glamorous 
mount Olympus, overall, they seem to follow Hercules’ method of interpretation in the field of 
health care.  
